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STATEWIDE SCHOOL ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LIABILITY; BRENTWOOD ACADEMY V.
TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCHOOL
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
ALAN R. MADRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its recent decision in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Ass'n,I the Supreme Court for the first time held that the
actions of a private, statewide school athletic association could be
treated as state action subjecting the association to the requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The case arose when Brentwood Acad-
emy, a private, parochial high school member of the Tennessee Secon-
dary School Athletic Association (TSSAA), sued to prevent the
Association from enforcing penalties that it had imposed on the Acad-
emy for violating recruiting rules.3 The penalties included suspending
the Academy's boy's football and basketball teams from tournament
play for two years, a fine of $3,000.00 and probation for the Academy's
entire athletic program for four years. The Academy alleged that the
Association's enforcement of the penalties constituted state action for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and as state action violated the
Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process as well as the First
Amendment. With the narrowest majority, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Souter, agreed with the Academy on the threshold issue that the
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; B.A., J.D., University of
Michigan.
1. 121 S. Ct. 924, 927 (2001).
2. Though Brentwood Academy is the first opinion in which the Supreme Court has
weighed in on the issue, a number of other courts over almost thirty years had already con-
fronted the liability of statewide high school athletic organizations to constitutional standards.
BrentwoodAcad., 121 S. Ct. at 929 n.1. Contrary to the tide of opinion and the decision of the
Supreme Court in Brentwood Academy, the Sixth Circuit found no state action in Brentwood
Academy. Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 180 F.3d 758 (6th
Cir. 1999).
3. Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. at 929. All facts related in this article, unless otherwise
noted, are drawn from the opinions discussed.
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Association was subject to constitutional scrutiny, but remanded the case
for decision on the substantive issues.
The state action doctrine, under which Brentwood was decided, is
among the most incoherent of the Court's constitutional doctrines.4 It
purports to be an interpretation of the language "No State shall," which
introduces each of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment - the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
Due Process Clause. That phrase appears to limit those guarantees to
the actions of the states and to deny any constitutional protection against
private defendants for their conduct. In other words, the duty bearers
under each clause are the states and not private persons and the rights
created by the Fourteenth Amendment protect only against the initia-
tives of the states.5
Nevertheless, from the very inception of the modern state action doc-
trine in the Court's early civil rights activism, it was clear that the Court
was fashioning a doctrine to overcome those limitations and to allow the
federal courts to hear actions against altogether private parties accused
of violating the guarantees provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.6
Though the facts of Brentwood bring the case somewhat close to the
4. Though fine distinctions in this regard among the Court's constitutional jurisprudence
would be difficult. See, e.g., Jed Rubinfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993)
("Throughout constitutional jurisprudence, only the right of privacy can compete seriously
with takings law for the doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle prize."). One could
easily say the same for substantive due process, the incorporation doctrine, the dormant com-
merce clause, the establishment clause, and indeed much of what followed the enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment including, and largely as a result of, the Court's decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (effectively depriving the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of any significance).
5. It is yet a distinct question whether any of those guarantees might impose a duty on the
states to provide protection in their state laws to persons against some purely private initia-
tives. But those would be protections administered in the first instance in the state courts
under state law. I have argued elsewhere that the Fourteenth Amendment, through the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, was intended to require the states to provide protection against
some private conduct. Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment;
State Action, Federalism and Congress, 59 Mo L. REV. 499 (1994). The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected the idea that the Constitution imposes any af-
firmative obligations on the states. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 203 (1989). Chief Justice Rehnquist made no effort to ascertain the original under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment.
6. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988) (5-4
decision) ("In the typical case raising a state-action issue, a private party has taken the deci-
sive step that caused the harm to the plaintiff, and the question is whether the State was
sufficiently involved to treat the decisive conduct as state action.").
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margins of the state action doctrine,7 it is nonetheless instructive of how
the Court has used the doctrine to reach groups and individuals that are
not state authorities. The TSSAA was chartered in 1925 as a not-for-
profit membership corporation under Tennessee law. Its members have
always been both public and private schools. However, it was not cre-
ated by an act of either the legislature or the Board of Education of the
State of Tennessee. It was not even acknowledged officially by the
Board of Education until 1972. The Association derives its entire au-
thority over its members from their voluntary membership agreements,
not from any delegation of the legislature's police power. Employees of
the Association are not regarded as state employees, though by statute
they are allowed to participate in the state's public retirement program.
Retirement funding for Association employees, however, comes from
the Association and not the state. Only four percent of the Association's
funding derives from dues paid by members. 8 The remainder comes
from gate receipts from tournaments sponsored by the Association. 9
Those tournaments are often held on fields owned by public bodies but
the Association must contract with each public body for the use of the
fields and pay for that use from its own funds.10
The most substantial connection between the Association and the
State of Tennessee is the fact that most of the Association's member
schools happen to be public schools. In 1997, when Brentwood Acad-
emy was sanctioned by the Association, 290 (roughly 84%) of the Asso-
ciation's 345 members were public schools. All of the members of its
elected legislative council and its administrative body were public school
officials, though principals, assistant principals, and superintendents
from any member school were eligible to be chosen for these bodies.
Additionally, in 1972, the State Board of Education by rule required the
state's public schools with athletic programs to join the Association. The
7. Brentwood is closer to the margins of the state action doctrine because government
employees, public high school administrators representing their school systems in the Associa-
tion, were involved in the adoption of the norms and penalties applied to Brentwood Acad-
emy. Nevertheless, the power exerted over Brentwood Academy derived completely from its
voluntary, contractual membership in the Association. The Association was not imposing
rules or penalties by virtue of any measure of the State's police power delegated to it by the
State legislature. Moreover, each of the public school administrators came from independent
school districts. They were not brought together in an agency created by the State of Tennes-
see to make state policy.
8. Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. at 928.
9. IL
10. Brentwood Acad., 180 F.3d at 762.
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State Board of Education rescinded that rule in 1996 making member-
ship by public schools once again voluntary.1'
Clearly, even after 1972 when the State Board of Education required
state public schools to join the Association and submit to its rules, the
only power that the Association exercised over private schools derived
from its membership agreements with those schools. It did not exercise
any authority that derived from the state constitution or the legislature.
Nor could the rules or regulations of the Association reasonably be re-
garded as reflecting state policies. The Association's rules were adopted
by its members, including representatives from private schools and rep-
resentatives from independent public schools and public school districts
across the state. Nevertheless, the Court held that the disciplinary ac-
tions taken by the Association against the private Brentwood Academy
amounted to state action under the Fourteenth Amendment "owing to
the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the
association, there being no offsetting reason to see the association's acts
in any other way."'"
The decision in Brentwood was foreshadowed thirteen years earlier
in dicta in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian.13 Tarkanian
was brought by Jerry Tarkanian, then the head basketball coach at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV). The circumstances in
Tarkanian were slightly more complicated than in Brentwood. The Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) had placed the UNLV
basketball team on probation for two years and ordered UNLV to show
cause why the NCAA should not impose further penalties if UNLV
failed to exclude Tarkanian from participating in its basketball program.
As in Brentwood, Tarkanian sued the NCAA alleging that its action vio-
lated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court held that the NCAA could not be regarded as a state actor for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment because its actions could not be
attributed to any particular state, its member public colleges having
come from all of the fifty states.14 But the Court added in dicta, in a
footnote, that "[t]he situation would, of course be different if the mem-
bership consisted entirely of institutions located within the same State,
many of them public institutions created by the same sovereign. ""5
11. Id.
12. Id. See also Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. at 927.
13. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
14. Id. at 193.
15. Id. at n.13.
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What is most remarkable about the Court's decision in Brentwood,
nevertheless, is that it came after almost thirty years of both the Burger
Court and the Rehnquist Court systematically shrinking the state action
doctrine and repeatedly rejecting efforts by plaintiffs to hold private par-
ties liable under constitutional standards, a movement reflected even in
Tarkanian. Given the very slim majority that found state action in Brent-
wood, the way that the decision rides against a strong contrary tide, and
the prospect of a substantial change in the composition of the Court
under the current conservative administration, it is worth pondering
Brentwood Academy's scope and durability even with regard to high
school athletic associations.
Section II below briefly describes the statutory context of actions like
those in Brentwood. Section III sketches the evolution of the state ac-
tion doctrine through three roughly distinct phases. Section IV consid-
ers the Court's decision in Tarkanian as the most immediate predecessor
to Brentwood. Section V analyzes the Court's decision in Brentwood
and Section VI speculates on the scope of that decision and its possible
future.
II. A BRIEF PRIMER ON SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
Though Brentwood Academy alleged that the Association had vio-
lated rights given under the Fourteenth Amendment, the cause of action
in Brentwood, as in virtually all actions alleging violations of Fourteenth
Amendment rights, was not the Fourteenth Amendment, but 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.16 That statute reads in significant part:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges ox immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. ... 17
Section 1983 thus states two elements that have to be alleged and
proven to make out a cause of action: (i) that the defendant have acted
under color of state law (ii) and while acting under color of state law
have caused the plaintiff to be deprived of a right secured by the Consti-
tution or other laws. Because the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment bind only the states, when the right alleged to have been violated
16. Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. at 929.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 2000).
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by the defendant is one secured by the Constitution, the defendant must
be the state. This is where the state action doctrine typically operates, to
convert some private parties into state actors to satisfy the second ele-
ment of an action under § 1983. The Court has also repeatedly held that
when the defendant is the state, or is otherwise liable under the state
action doctrine, the first requirement of § 1983, that the defendant have
acted under color of state law, is also automatically satisfied."8
An enormous and tangled thicket of jurisprudence has grown up
around or closely related to § 1983 since it was enacted in 1871 as part of
the Ku Klux Klan Act.19 Much of that jurisprudence was developed in
the twentieth century to overcome the Court's interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment as depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction over
cases brought by a citizen against his or her own state.2" In 1908, for
instance, in the landmark case of Ex parte Young,2" the Court held that a
state official when named individually as a defendant was not the state
18. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) ("In cases under § 1983,
'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' re-
quired under the Fourteenth Amendment."). See also Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. at 930 n.2;
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982).
19. See generally Act of April 20, 1871, ch.22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. The Ku Kux Klan Act is
also sometimes referred to as the Civil Rights Act of 1871. For an excellent discussion of the
many vagaries of § 1983 jurisprudence, see generally Theodore Eisenberg, § 1983: Doctrinal
Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982).
20. The Eleventh Amendment reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Though by its terms the Amendment only bars actions against a state
by a citizen of another state, the Supreme Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as also
barring an action by a citizen against his or her own state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16
(1889).
The Court has held that Congress nevertheless has the power under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity but only within the scope of
rights protected by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,451-
52 (1976). Though § 1983 was adopted under the authority of § 5, and by its terms was clearly
intended to permit actions against state officials, the Court has held that Congress did not
intend by the adoption of § 1983 to abrogate any part of sovereign immunity for those actions.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674 (1974). Thus, the holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), is still crucial to actions under § 1983. For excellent discussions of the original
understanding of the scope of § 1983 liability, see David Achtenberg, A "Milder Measure of
Villainy": The Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of "Under Color of'
Law, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 1; Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the
Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277 (1965).
21. 209 U.S. 123. Ex parte Young was not itself a § 1983 case. It was brought in part
against the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota to enjoin the enforcement of new
railroad rate schedules adopted by the Minnesota legislature. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Peckham, famously held that
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for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, at least where the relief
sought was only an injunction to halt the enforcement of state law.22 The
Court has also held that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect mu-
nicipal corporations,23 counties,24 or school boards.' Needless to say,
when the defendant is a private organization or person, as is the TSSAA,
there is no issue of Eleventh Amendment Immunity. But again, that
merely highlights the incoherence of holding a private person or organi-
zation liable under the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. By its
clear terms, the Amendment only runs against the states. Therefore, one
would think that the Eleventh Amendment would be an issue in all
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the
name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of the complainants is
a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its
sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official.... If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation
of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into
conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped
of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the conse-
quences of his individual conduct.
Id. at 159-160. The doctrine articulated by Justice Peckham is commonly referred to as the
stripping doctrine of Ex parte Young. The stripping doctrine perversely overcomes Eleventh
Amendment immunity by depriving a state agent of precisely what makes it possible for his or
her conduct to be amenable to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, that he or she was acting as
an agent of the state. Charles Alan Wright observed of Ex parte Young that it "created the
anomaly that enforcement of the Minnesota statute is state action for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment but merely the individual wrong of Edward T. Young for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment." CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 309 (5th ed.
1994). In the context of an action under § 1983, the stripping doctrine is doubly perverse since
it would also appear to eliminate the possibility that the action is under color of state law. To
revise Holmes's famous observation, the life of the law is neither logic nor experience, but the
expedient ipsi dixit of a politically motivated Court.
22. The Court has explicitly held that the stripping doctrine of Ex parte Young does not
apply in actions seeking money damages that are to be paid out of the state treasury. See, e.g.,
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663. The Court affirmed the holding in Edelman in Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 334 (1979); Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing
Home Ass'n., 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981); and in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470
U.S. 226, 230 (1985). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar an action for damages brought
against a state agent personally, however, and not as an agent of the state even for conduct
alleged to be "under color of state law."
23. Cf. Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R. Co., 255 U.S. 56 (1921). The Court has
also held that municipal corporations are persons as the term is used in § 1983 and is conse-
quently subject to liability under § 1983. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
667 (1978), overruling in part Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
24. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
25. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277 (1977).
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§ 1983 cases in which the right alleged to have been violated is given in
the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
It is yet an interesting question why a plaintiff would chose to bring
an action under § 1983 when § 1983 does not avoid the Eleventh
Amendment bars and when the ultimate right being vindicated is in any
event one of the self-executing guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.27 Ex parte Young is itself an example of a non- § 1983 action
brought directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. Similar actions to
vindicate constitutional rights against agents of the federal government
are allowed directly under particular constitutional provisions.2 8 The an-
swer to that question is altogether practical: 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) allows
attorneys fees to successful plaintiffs in actions under section 1983.
There is no similar provision for attorney's fees for actions directly under
the Constitution. Consequently, even though an attorney might be able
to bring an action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, it would
be foolish to do so.
Regardless of how an action is brought to vindicate Fourteenth
Amendment rights, i.e., directly under the Fourteenth Amendment or
under § 1983, if the action is against a private defendant, it can proceed
only if the defendant can be regarded as a state actor under the state
action doctrine.
26. The inconsistency is not limited to instances in which the state action doctrine con-
verts private conduct into state action. Despite holding that the Eleventh Amendment does
not protect counties, cities, and school boards, the Court nevertheless regards each of these
entities as the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brentwood itself is an exam-
ple of the Court treating public schools as the state. See generally JOHN C. JEFFRIES ET AL.,
CIVIL RIGHTS AcTIONS: ENFORCINc THE CONST1ITUTION (2000).
27. The rights created by the Fourteenth Amendment are self-executing precisely in the
sense that no further action by Congress is required to make them effective. The first pro-
posed draft of the Fourteenth Amendment read very differently from the final version in this
regard. Instead of creating the guarantees that now appear in § 1, it merely authorized Con-
gress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all person in the
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property." Madry, supra note
5. at 539 (citations omitted). This version was rejected in favor of self-executing rights out of
fear that when southern members of Congress returned to power, they would quickly abro-
gate any civil rights laws already adopted and prevent adoption of any other. Id. at 539-541.
28. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 393-94 (1971). Since 1974 the Federal Torts Claims Act applies to such cases brought
against federal "investigative and law enforcement officers." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994).
[Vol. 12:365
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III. THE STATE ACION DocrmNm
The state action doctrine has evolved through three roughly distinct
phases since its introduction in the late 1920s. In the first phase, the
Court cast about without success for a theory that might rationalize its
expansion of the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to embrace
private wrongdoing. In the second phase commencing in the 1960s, the
Court gave up the quest and typical of the time settled for a doctrine that
made no pretense to textual or historical justification or even decisional
standards. The state action doctrine in its second phase was explicitly an
opportunity for the Court to do justice as it saw fit case by case. The
expansive second phase abruptly gave way to the third and current phase
with the emergence of the conservative Burger-Rehnquist Courts in
1972. The newly minted conservative majority immediately and sharply
curtailed the state action doctrine in the first instance by limiting the
doctrine to its paradigm precedents and then interpreting those prece-
dents as narrowly as possible. Yet for all of its efforts, the Court in the
most recent phase has not eliminated the doctrine, as Brentwood attests.
A. Early State Action; the Search for a Theory
The birth and early development of the state action doctrine came
with the Court's decisions in the infamous White Primary Cases. The
White Primary Cases were a series of five Supreme Court decisions
handed down between 1927 and 1953 involving ever more private and
local efforts by the Democratic Party of Texas to exclude Blacks from its
primaries. 29 In the first of these decisions, Nixon v. Herndon from 1927,
the Court allowed an action for damages under the Equal Protection
.Clause against certain judges of election who had been appointed by the
private Democratic Party of Texas to run its state primary. The judges
had excluded Black would-be electors from the primaries as required by
then existing state laws. While the discriminatory Texas statute itself was
patently unconstitutional, the Court never made it clear why the private
judges of elections, who would appear to have been merely regulated
parties, could be sued under the Fourteenth Amendment as if they were
29. The White Primary Cases, in the order in which they were decided, consist of Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Grovey v. Townsend, 295
U.S. 45 (1935); Smith v. Allwright 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruling Grovey, 295 U.S. 45); and
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). The origin of the doctrine is often attributed to the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also
Madry, supra note 5.
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agents of the State. 30 Indeed, Justice Holmes' terse, three-page opinion
for the majority does not even acknowledge the issue.31
Gradually, over the succeeding twenty two years, the Texas legisla-
ture and the Texas Democratic Party moved the source of the policy
from the state's laws to the party's bylaws exclusively. But with only one
exception, later overruled, the Court relentlessly allowed actions against
the private judges of election.32 By the last decision in 1952, Terry v.
Adams, however, a majority of the Court still could not converge on a
single theory that supported applying the Constitution to concededly pri-
vate parties. Terry v. Adams involved the exclusion of Blacks from a
county-wide pre-primary selection process conducted according to local
party bylaws.33 Justice Black offered at least two distinct theories. With
only one dissenting vote, the Court split over three theories, none of
which attracted more than four votes. According to the first, the Fif-
teenth Amendment, which like the Fourteenth Amendment does not ex-
tend rights against private parties,34 nevertheless "establishes a national
policy, obviously applicable to the right of Negroes not to be discrimi-
nated against as voters in elections to determine public governmental
policies or to select public officials, national, state, or local. ' 35 Justice
30. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 539.
31. Holmes did observe,
[t]hat private damage may be caused by such political action and may be recovered for
in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby v.
White... and has been recognized by this Court.... If the defendants' conduct was a
wrong to the plaintiff the same reasons that allow a recovery for denying the plaintiff a
vote at a final election allow it for denying a vote at the primary election that may
determine the final result.
Id. at 540. However, these observations had nothing to do with the liability of the private
defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment. They are rather in response to the defendants'
claim that their conduct was not actionable because it was political in nature. The defendants
did not appear to argue, or at least Justice Holmes did not acknowledge any argument to the
effect that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the defendants because they were not
agents of the State of Texas. Indeed, the cases that Justice Holmes cited in this passage were
decided long before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
32. The exception was the third case, Grovey, 295 U.S. 45. By Grovey, the source of the
discriminatory policy was exclusively the party's bylaws. For that reason, the Court found that
there was no state action, therefore no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and dismissed
the action. Grovey was overturned nine years later in Allwright, 321 U.S. 649.
33. Terry, 345 U.S. at 461-62.
34. Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment reads in its entirety:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
U.S. CoNsT. amend XV§ 1.
35. Terry, 345 U.S. at 467.
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Black also claimed that the Fifteenth Amendment imposes on the states
an affirmative obligation not to permit discriminatory primaries.3 6 He
never explained how that duty might be derived from the text or history
of the Fifteenth Amendment or how such a duty, imposed by his theory
on the states by the Constitution, could give rise to constitutional viola-
tions by private parties.
Justice Frankfurter, writing only for himself, essentially rejected the
idea that persons who are state officials could ever act in a private capac-
ity in any political arena free from constitutional scrutiny and moreover
that their involvement in otherwise private parties converted the actions
of the parties into state action. He wrote, "[i]f the Jaybird Association
[which ran a discriminatory pre-primary selection process for democratic
candidates] is a device to defeat the law of Texas regulating primaries,
and if the electoral officials, clothed with State power in the county,
share in that subversion, they cannot divest themselves of the State au-
thority and help as participants in the scheme."37
Justice Clark, writing the third of the three opinions concurring in the
result, revived a version of the theory of Smith v. Allwright, the fourth of
the series and the immediate predecessor to Terry v. Adams. In his view
Smith v. Allwright had established the principle that "any 'part of the
machinery for choosing officials' becomes subject to the Constitution's
restraints."38 The only element shared by each of these various theories
is that they are narrowly tailored to elections. None addresses more
generally the problem of holding private parties liable under constitu-
tional provisions that clearly limit their scope to the actions of the states.
None, too, has lived much beyond Terry v. Adams.
One of the most interesting opinions from this same early period had
nothing to do with voting rights. Marsh v. Alabama,39 from 1946, was an
appeal from a conviction for criminal trespass. The defendant-appellant,
a Jehovah's Witness, had been proselytizing in Chickasaw, Alabama, a
company town wholly owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation.
When she refused to cease and leave the town, the town's deputy sheriff
arrested her and she was tried and convicted for trespass.4n Writing for
the majority, Justice Black again offered a number of theories, none
36. Id. at 469 ("For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to
permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of the Fifteenth
Amendment.").
37. IdJ at 475-76.
38. Id. at 481.
39. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
40. Id. at 502-03.
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clearly distinct from the others.4 Anticipating the Court's later opinion
in Shelley v. Kramer,42 he focused on the role of the state in enforcing
the private decision. He wrote that "a state statute, as the one here in-
volved, which enforces such action by criminally punishing those who
attempt to distribute religious literature clearly violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution."43 Justice Black also an-
ticipated his opinion in Terry v. Adams and appeared to suggest that the
states have an affirmative obligation to prevent a company town from
attempting to stop people from proselytizing. He said, again without any
supporting argument, that, "[i]n our view the circumstance that the prop-
erty rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty . . . took
place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the
41. Id. at 502-10.
42. 334 U.S. 1. Shelley is not itself technically a state action case. It did not extend consti-
tutional liability to private parties nor did it attribute private motives to the state. Neverthe-
less, Shelley did contribute one enormous misunderstanding to Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the majority, claimed that
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, the principle has
become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be
that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful.
334 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Vinson was surely correct that, in the absence
of the state action doctrine, the Fourteenth Amendment directly inhibits only action by the
states. But it does not follow from that fact that the Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct. Nor was that the holding in the Civil Rights Cases. To the contrary,
Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases made it abundantly clear that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended to protect people against private conduct. See generally Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3. The mechanism, however, was not to create constitutional rights against people
but to compel the states to create and enforce laws that would protect people against people.
He wrote, "[t]his abrogation and denial of rights [running between private parties], for which
the States alone were or could be responsible, was the great seminal and fundamental wrong
which was intended to be remedied." Id. at 18. Bradley's opinion for the Court in the Civil
Rights Cases can easily be read as an effort to overturn the Court's earlier decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, that effectively annulled the Privileges or Immunities
clause of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Bradley's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment finds substantial support in the record of the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See generally Madry, supra note 5.
Shelley was an action to enforce a racially restrictive deed covenant. 334 U.S. at 4. The
Court refused to apply the Equal Protection Clause to nullify the covenant, for the reason
mentioned above. But it held that the action of the state court in enforcing the covenant was
state action, as it plainly was, and that the state court's enforcement of the covenant violated
the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 21. The decision in Shelley is unique. Both before and
after that decision, the Court insisted that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause only
when it engages in intentional discrimination or private discrimination can be attributed to the
state by virtue of the state action doctrine.
43. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508.
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State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as
to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such re-
straint by the application of a state statute."44
Both theories would appear to apply to the state alone. Each would
effect private conduct, in the first instance by preventing state enforce-
ment of a private choice, in the second by requiring the states to prevent
private initiatives, but neither justifies a cause of action against the pri-
vate actor. Black went further however. "The more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general," he
claimed, "the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it."'45 The only explanation he
offered for this novel idea was that whoever owned the property, a cor-
poration or an arm of the state "the public in either case has an identical
interest in the functioning of the community in such a manner that the
channels of communication remain free."46
The doctrine that Black announced in Marsh has come to be known
as the "public function doctrine." It would appear to set some limits, as
Justice Black developed his argument, not only to private liability under
the Fourteenth Amendment, but also to the obligation of the govern-
ment to prevent private initiatives that are said to violate the Constitu-
tion.4 7 Private liability and the obligation of the state to vigilantly
protect its citizens arises only when the private actor opens its property
to public use. A similar intuition surfaces in many of the opinions in the
White Primary Cases - when the challenged conduct can be character-
ized as somehow "public," either because traditionally it has been re-
garded as "infected with a public purpose" (Marsh) or because it
concerns matters of governance or politics (the White Primary Cases), it
will be subject to constitutional standards.48 But if the focus is really on
the interests of people effected by the private initiative, it is not obvious
why the public function is significant. Even a single person, after all, can
effectively prevent another from voting or proselytizing. And that is the
direction that the doctrine took in the second, expansive phase of state
action. Marsh, for example, was extended in the second phase of state
44. Id. at 509.
45. Id. at 506.
46. Id. at 507.
47. See generally id.
48. See generally Terry, 345 U.S. 461; Marsh, 326 U.S. 501; Allwright, 321 U.S. 649;
Grovey, 295 U.S. 45; Condon, 286 U.S. 73; Herndon, 273 U.S. 536.
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action in 1968 to include a shopping mall.49 That decision was over-
turned in the third phase and Marsh and its public function doctrine
were limited to the precise facts in Marsh, company towns.5 0 Such has
been the history of state action.
B. Freewheeling State Action; The Second Phase.
The opinion that inaugurated the second phase of the state action
doctrine, and is among the doctrine's high water marks, came in 1961 in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.5 ' Burton was an action for declara-
tory and injunctive relief brought by a Black man who had been denied
service in a privately owned and operated restaurant in Wilmington,
Delaware. Because the restaurant was located in a parking structure
owned by the City of Wilmington, the Court held that the City could be
held responsible for the discrimination and that the owner could be sued
for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 It was in Burton that
the Court for the first time offered something of a general test, if not a
theory, for finding state action in private conduct. It held, "private con-
duct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection
Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifesta-
tions has been found to have become involved in it." 3 Should a state
become sufficiently involved in the private initiative, then the initiative
becomes state action and the private actor can be held liable under con-
stitutional standards. Correlatively, when the state becomes involved in
the private conduct, by virtue of its involvement the state can be held
accountable for the private initiative. 4
While the touchstone of the doctrine thus came to be state involve-
ment in private conduct, the Court refused to define with any particular-
49. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308,
309 (1968).
50. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 516 (1976).
51. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 722. The quote reveals a curious lack of rigor in thinking about the nature of
rights. The individual rights that the quote alludes to are those given by the Equal Protection
Clause. But if those rights impose their correlative duties only to the states, then private
parties cannot possibly abridge them. The logic, or lack of logic, in Burton is in sharp contrast
to Justice Bradley's discussion in the Civil Rights Cases. Bradley usefully distinguished be-
tween the violation of a right and the abrogation of a right. Legal rights were understood
positivistically as creatures of the state. A private person violated a right when he or she acted
in a way that upset the interests protected by the right. A state, on the other hand, abrogated
a right when it removed the law from the books.
54. Id. at 725.
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ity what constituted "involvement." The Court explained its refusal as
follows:
Because the virtue of the right to equal protection of the laws
could lie only in the breadth of its application, its constitutional
assurance was reserved in terms whose imprecision was necessary
if the right were to be enjoyed in the variety of individual-state
relationships which the Amendment was designed to embrace.
For the same reason, to fashion and apply a precise formula for
recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection
Clause is an "impossible task" which "This Court has never
attempted."55
The test thus became no test at all but merely an opportunity for the
Court, case-by-case, to extend the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to
altogether private agents and purely private initiatives. Burton itself is
an example of how the doctrine could be used to find responsibility and
a kind of quasi-agency where the law had never before found them and
for which no sound explanation was ever offered.
Over the succeeding decade the Court invoked the involvement test
most notably to overturn a series of criminal trespass convictions that
were initiated by the owners of private lunch counters. These decisions,
now commonly referred to as the "Lunch Counter Cases," each began
with events similar to those in Burton: one or more Black patrons were
denied service at private lunch counters. In each case, the Black patrons
refused to leave the restaurant when requested by the owner. The
owner then called the police and the patrons were ultimately convicted
of criminal trespass in the state courts. The defendants in each case
raised the state action doctrine to challenge the criminal complaint. Be-
cause of the posture of the cases, the state action doctrine played a
somewhat narrower role than in Burton. These decisions did not hold
private parties to constitutional standards. Rather, they used the in-
volvement of the state in the enforcement of private discrimination to
attribute the private discriminatory purpose to the state. Thus the state's
use of the neutral criminal trespass statute to enforce private discrimina-
tion became tainted by the private intentions.56
55. Id. at 722 (quoting Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556
(1947)).
56. The Lunch Counter Cases include, in the order in which they were decided, Peterson
v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Robin-
son v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); and Adickes v.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Adickes differed from the other decisions in that it was a
§ 1983 action against a restaurant and not an appeal from a criminal conviction for trespass.
In Bell v. Maryland the Court never reached the state action issue because it held that a new
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As in every case after Burton, the inquiry focused on the nature and
extent of the state's involvement in the private initiative. In the first of
the Lunch Counter Cases, Peterson v. City of Greenville57 in 1963, the
Court found state involvement in a local ordinance that required restau-
rant owners, if they were to serve patrons of different races, to maintain
separate facilities for each race. The statute thus involved the state in
the private discrimination by compelling it, even if, Chief Justice Warren
wrote, "the manager would have acted as he did independently of the
existence of the ordinance."59 Similarly, in Robinson v. Florida,6 ° the
third of the Lunch Counter Cases from 1964, the State of Florida in-
volved itself in private discrimination by virtue of a state health regula-
tion that required restaurants serving both races to maintain separate
toilet facilities.61 The regulation may not have required segregated res-
taurants but the Court found it created a disincentive for owners to serve
all races and thus involved the state in the private discrimination.62
The last of the Lunch Counter Cases was Adickes v. Kress & Co. in
1970.63 Adickes was also the last of the pre-Rehnquist era state-action
cases and it demonstrated how far the Court at that time was willing to
go to find involvement, as well as the oddness of the doctrine in general.
Unlike the other Lunch Counter Cases, Adickes was brought as a § 1983
action against the restaurant that had refused to serve the plaintiff. The
facts in Adickes were also substantially different from the facts in all of
the other decisions. The plaintiff was a white teacher who came to de-
fendant's restaurant with a group of her Black students. The restaurant
took orders from the students but refused to serve the plaintiff because
she made the group racially mixed. When the restaurant refused to
serve the plaintiff, the entire group voluntarily left the restaurant. The
defendant never called the police. Nevertheless, as the plaintiff and her
students left the restaurant, a police officer who happened to have been
state civil rights act probably effectively eliminated the crime. It reversed the conviction and
remanded the case to the state court for an authoritative determination. 378 U.S. 226.
57. 373 U.S. 244.
58. Id. at 248.
59. Id.
60. 378 U.S. 153.
61. Id. at 156.
62. Id. Arguably, the ordinance in Peterson, 373 U.S. 244, did not compel whites-only
restaurants, as the Court held. But like the state regulation in Robinson, 378 U.S. 153, it too
made it more difficult for a restaurant so inclined to serve patrons of both races.
63. 398 U.S. 144.
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in the restaurant and observed the plaintiff sitting down with her stu-
dents, arrested plaintiff as a vagrant.64
Clearly responding to the requirements of § 1983, the plaintiff al-
leged, among other things,65 that the restaurant had acted pursuant to a
custom of segregation in the community, a custom that was enforced by
state law.6 The district court directed a verdict for defendants when
plaintiff failed to show that the state regularly used its criminal trespass
statute against people like the plaintiff who attempted to eat in a racially
mixed group. Going well beyond its earlier decisions, the Court re-
versed and held that a custom of segregation was enforced by the state
when the state tolerated threats of violence against those who would vio-
late the custom, including against a restaurant that served racially mixed
groups. 67 It also held that a custom of segregation, enforced by police
lassitude, provided the state action necessary to make out a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.68 Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan
concluded "that [plaintiff] would show an abridgement of her equal pro-
tection right, if she proves that Kress refused her service because of a
state-enforced custom of segregating the races in public restaurants. 69
What makes Adickes radical, and takes it even beyond the scope of
Burton, is that the Court appears explicitly to endorse the idea that a
private person can be held to constitutional standards, and sued for dam-
ages under § 1983, even if the private conduct is compelled by the state.
Adickes was not the first case in which the Court held a private party to
constitutional standards for merely complying with state laws. That was
the circumstance in the very first state action case, Nixon v. Condon in
1927.70 But in Nixon v. Condon, Justice Holmes failed to even acknowl-
64. Id. at 146-50.
65. The plaintiff in a separate count also alleged that the defendant had entered into a
conspiracy with the police to deprive her of the Equal Protection of the law. Id. at 148. Based
upon the affidavits of the police and deposition testimony of the store manager that the store
had not called the police, the district court granted summary judgement to the defendants on
this count. Id. The Court reversed and held that the depositions and affidavits failed to fore-
close the possibility that the arresting officer had communicated his disapproval of the situa-
tion to an employee of the defendant while in the store. Id. at 157. It also held that had there
been a meeting of the minds, there would have been a conspiracy and the conspiracy would
have satisfied the state action requirement. Id. at 152, 158.
66. Recall that § 1983 requires that the offending action have been committed "under
color of any statute, regulation, custom or usage, of any State .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 &
Supp. VI 2000) (emphasis added).
67. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 173.
68. Id. at 170.
69. Id. at 171.
70. 286 U.S. 73.
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edge the state action issue.71 Adickes is distinctive in that the Court ad-
dressed the state action issue and endorsed this peculiar principle.
Justice Harlan wrote, "there is much support in lower court opinions for
the conclusion that discriminatory acts by private parties done under the
compulsion of state law offend the Fourteenth Amendment. 72
Quite clearly, were a state to require a private party to discriminate
against someone on account of race, the state requirement would violate
the Equal Protection Clause and it would not be unnatural to say that
the state was responsible for the private discrimination. But it is yet a
different move to hold the private party liable for damages under the
Fourteenth Amendment for essentially complying with a state law. It is
that second move that the state action doctrine makes possible but which
the Court never attempted to justify.
C. The Rehnquist Revolution.
In 1972, the political composition of the Supreme Court began to
shift dramatically and with it the state action doctrine. Chief Justice
Warren Burger joined the Court in 1969, replacing Chief Justice Earl
Warren. Both Justice Powell and Justice William Rehnquist were ap-
pointed to the Court in 1972, replacing respectively Justice Black and
Justice Harlan. 73 Over the ensuing twenty-nine years, Justice Rehnquist
penned five of the roughly twelve decisions applying the state action
doctrine 74 as well as the first, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,75 which re-
shaped the test into roughly its present form.
Moose Lodge arose when Leroy Irvis, a Black man, sued the Moose
Lodge of Harrisburg, Virginia and the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board to enjoin the Lodge's liquor license so long as it excluded Blacks
as members or guests. The Lodge refused to admit Irvis when a white
71. Id.
72. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 170-71.
73. The shift was complete in 1975 when Justice Stevens replaced Justice Douglas. The
only remaining justices from the Warren Court were Justices Brennan, Marshall, White and
Stewart. Justice Stewart was replaced by Justice O'Connor in 1981.
74. They include: Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. 924; American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sulli-
van, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); Edmonson v. Leesvill Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Tarkanian,
488 U.S. 179; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982);
Lugar, 457 U.S. 922; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149 (1978); Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Of the twelve decisions, Chief
Justice Rehnquist dissented in three (Lugar, Edmondson, and Brentwood). Thus, of the nine
decisions in which Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority, he wrote over half of the
opinions for the Court.
75. 407 U.S. 163.
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friend brought him to the Lodge as a guest. A three-judge district court
panel granted the injunction. Invoking Burton, it found that the Liquor
Control Board had sufficiently involved itself in the business of the
Lodge so that the private discrimination had to be regarded as state ac-
tion. The Liquor Authority, the panel held, had involved itself in busi-
ness of the Lodge in two respects. First, by the mere grant of the liquor
license and secondly through a regulation that required each licensed
club to "adhere to all the provisions of its constitution and bylaws"76
which in the case of the Moose Lodge, mandated the exclusion.77
One of the great dangers of standardless, intuitive doctrines, like the
state action doctrine, is that when the intuitions of a newly constituted
Court depart from the intuitions and goals of those who created the doc-
trine, little has to be done to change course. And so it was with Moose
Lodge. Justice Rehnquist first read the preceding decisions as discrete
types, creating a limited and together an exclusive set of kinds of in-
volvement. He then read those precedents as narrowly limited to their
particular facts. Thus, Burton came to represent involvement through a
symbiotic relation. Moose Lodge failed the symbiotic relation test be-
cause "while Eagle was a public restaurant in a public building, Moose
Lodge is a private social club in a private building."78 With one excep-
tion, the Liquor Control Board also did not "foster or encourage racial
discrimination" as had occurred in earlier cases.79
The one exception was the fact that the Liquor Control Board's regu-
lations, by requiring licensed clubs to abide by their bylaws, coinciden-
tally required the Moose Lodge to abide by its discriminatory rules. But
even though Justice Rehnquist here conceded that the regulations suffi-
ciently involved the State in the private discrimination, he significantly
departed in the way that he remedied the involvement. In the earlier
cases, a finding of involvement converted the private discrimination to
state action making both the private defendant and the state liable under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The remedy would focus on the com-
plained of private conduct, converted by the state action doctrine into
state action. The approach is evident in the dissents of both Justices
Douglas and Brennan. Justice Brennan in no uncertain terms declared
that "[w]hen Moose Lodge obtained its liquor license, the State of Penn-
sylvania became an active participant in the operation of the Lodge
76. Irvis v. Scott 318 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (M.D. Penn. 1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
77. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 164-71.
78. Id. at 175.
79. Id. at 176-77.
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bar."8 Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall would have upheld the
injunction issued by the district court, precisely the remedy requested by
Mr. Irvis. 1 Justice Rehnquist and the majority, however, looked only to
the action of the state itself and merely enjoined the enforcement of the
Liquor Control Board's regulation "insofar as that regulation requires
compliance by the Moose Lodge with provisions of its constitution and
bylaws containing racially discriminatory provisions."82 Thus the condi-
tions for finding state action in private initiatives became tightly limited
and the relief if state action were found a mere shadow of what it had
been.
In subsequent decisions, Justice Rehnquist added a rhetorical ele-
ment that tied together the conditions for finding state actions and si-
multaneously superficially made more sense of the doctrine, but also
underscored its essential oddness. The rhetorical element was the notion
of attribution. In general, for state action to be found in a private initia-
tive, the private decision had to be fairly attributable to the state. For
example, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 3 in 1974, in which the
plaintiff alleged that a private utility had terminated her electricity with-
out due process of law, Justice Rehnquist concluded his analysis by ob-
serving that "the State of Pennsylvania is not sufficiently connected with
respondent's action in terminating petitioner's service so as to make re-
spondent's conduct in so doing attributable to the State for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment. '8 4 Justice Rehnquist had earlier explained.
"the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the State itself."85
Eight years later, Justice Rehnquist explicitly and emphatically
grounded the test of state action in ordinary notions of state responsibil-
ity. In an opinion for the majority in Blum v. Yaretsky86 he explained
that "[tihe purpose of this requirement [from Jackson] is to assure that
constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the
State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff com-
80. Id. at 184 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. On the strength of earlier decisions, Mr. Irvis could easily have requested and re-
ceived even greater relief, including damages against the Moose Lodge. Compare Burton, 365
U.S. 715, with Atkins, 487 U.S. 42.
82. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 179.
83. 419 U.S. 345.
84. Id. at 358-59.
85. Id. at 351 (citing Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 176).
86. 457 U.S. 991.
[Vol. 12:365
2001] BRENTWOOD ACADEMY
plains. ' 87 Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the types of sufficient
state involvement is consistent with this notion. The idea appears to
make some sense when the focus is on the action alone. If the action can
be regarded as the action of the state, then it is more reasonable to find
that the action violated a right created by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Surely if the state is responsible for a private action, it is not unreasona-
ble to hold the state responsible for the consequences of the action.
Nevertheless, the effect of finding state action is not simply to allow an
action against the state; it is also to hold a private party responsible
under the Constitution. And there is nothing in the Rehnquist reformu-
lation of the doctrine that rationalizes that move. Even when the private
party can be said to have conspired with the government but neverthe-
less acted for its own reasons, the action of the private agent can be
treated as a distinct act not covered by the injunctions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In cases where the private action is regarded as state ac-
tion because the state encourages or especially commands the action,
holding the private party responsible seems perverse.88
87. I& at 1004.
88. Justice Rehnquist is also responsible for one of the most bizarre twists to the state
action doctrine. In Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. 149, writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist
held that a state statute creating a statutory lien in favor of a warehouse accompanied by a
self-help foreclosure procedure was not state action and was therefore immune to due process
scrutiny. Id. at 153. The case was brought against a private warehouse by a woman
threatened with foreclosure of the warehouseman's lien and the sale of her stored possession.
Id. Justice Rehnquist found that the statute did not constitute state action because it did not
require any state agent to participate in the foreclosure of the lien or the sale of stored goods.
Because no state official participated in the execution of the lien, Justice Rehnquist reasoned
there was no state involvement in the private sale and the private conduct could not be attrib-
uted to the state. Id at 165. The statute was simply a declaration by the state that it would
not interfere in the actions of the warehouseman.
The Court had never before used the doctrine to insulate what was obviously, literally state
action. The purpose of the doctrine from the beginning was to extend the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment against purely private action. Justice Rehnquist also reached his con-
clusion only by ignoring the obvious fact that the statute made it possible for the warehouse-
man to convey title to the stored goods, and not just possession. The statute consequently was
substantially more than a declaration by the state of its intention not to intervene in the self-
help remedy of the warehouseman. The statute gave that act a significance it could not other-
wise have.
The case also provided Justice Rehnquist the opportunity to limit the Court's earlier due
process decisions protecting debtors against pre-judgment creditor remedies. He did so, how-
ever, at the expense of insulating from all due process scrutiny what would have been the most
egregious prejudgment creditor remedy under the prior decisions. See generally N. Ga. Finish-
ing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); Fuentes v. Shevins, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969). Justice Rehnquist was able to distinguish Flagg Bros. from the rest by disingenuously
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IV. THE ROAD TO BRENTWOOD: NCAA v. TARKANIAN
In late August 1977, the NCAA notified UNLV that it had placed
UNLV's basketball team on probation for two years, during which time
the basketball team was excluded from postseason games and could not
appear on television.89 It also ordered UNLV to show cause why the
NCAA should not impose additional sanctions if UNLV did not immedi-
ately remove the team's coach, Jerry Tarkanian, from UNLV's intercol-
legiate athletic program during the probationary period. Faced with dire
alternatives, UNLV capitulated and in September, 1977, notified
Tarkanian that he was to be suspended as coach of the basketball team.90
Tarkanian responded by bringing a § 1983 action in the Nevada state
court against UNLV alleging that his demotion by UNLV deprived him
of his right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
After prolonged proceedings that included an inexplicable four year de-
lay by the Nevada district court, the joinder of the NCAA as defendant
at its initiative, and a number of failed attempts by the NCAA to remove
treating the others as involving preliminary state action issues. In fact, because of the way that
the other cases arose, none presented a state action issue.
The dissenters in Flagg Bros., aided by the swing vote of Justice Blackmun, turned Justice
Rehnquist's ruse against him four years later in Lugar, 457 U.S. 922. Because the prejudg-
ment garnishment in Lugar required a court clerk to issue a writ of attachment, the Court held
for the first time that the debtor could sue a private creditor for money damages in a § 1983
action alleging a violation of due process. The truly unfortunate consequence of Justice Rehn-
quist's too clever analysis in Flagg Bros. was that the Court never seriously addressed the
reasonableness of allowing essentially a constitutional action against a private creditor who
takes advantage of a statutorily created prejudgment remedy. Alan R. Madry, State Action
and the Due Process of Self-Help; Flagg Bros. Redux, 62 U. PiTt. L. REV. 1 (2000).
89. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 186. The NCAA's investigation began in late November 1972,
with a preliminary inquiry. Three years later, the preliminary investigation resulted in an
Official Inquiry in which UNLV initially required itself to conduct a thorough investigation.
Though Tarkanian had only joined UNLV's basketball program in the Fall of 1973, many of
the violations alleged involved Tarkanian. UNLV reported its findings in 1976, clearing itself
and Tarkanian of all wrongdoing. The NCAA's Committee on Infractions conducted four
days of hearings and eventually found that many of the charges could not be substantiated.
However, it did find 38 violations of NCAA rules, including 10 committed by Tarkanian.
Many of the most serious violations committed by Tarkanian appear to have occurred in the
course of investigation and concerned efforts by Tarkanian to fabricate evidence and encour-
aging witnesses to change their testimony. Id. at 185-186.
90. Id. at 180-81. The university's vice-president identified three options: 1) Reject the
order to show cause and risk heavier sanctions, 2) Pull out of the NCAA, or 3) Suspend
Tarkanian. Id. at 187. Tarkanian was a tenured member of the university's faculty and his
suspension as coach of the basketball team did not affect his standing as a member of the
faculty. It did, however, substantially affect his salary.
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the action to federal court, Tarkanian finally was awarded injunctive re-
lief and attorneys fees against both UNLV and the NCAA.91
In what had become something of a pattern for state action decisions
during the Rehnquist years, the Supreme Court reversed the NCAA's
liability by the slimmest of margins.92 As Justice Stevens noted, writing
for the majority, Tarkanian presented something of the mirror image of
state action cases. In the typical case, as we've seen, the plaintiff is in-
jured by the actions of a private party and seeks to convert the private
conduct into state action so that the private defendant can then be ac-
cused of violating a constitutional guarantee which otherwise binds only
the states. Under the Rehnquist reformulation, transubstantiation oc-
curs only if the private action can be attributed to the state so that it is
reasonable to regard the action as originating with the state or as an
exercise of an exclusive state power or otherwise supporting state ends.
In Tarkanian, however, Jerry Tarkanian was suspended by the public
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, but was alleging that the real impetus
for the action came from the private NCAA. According to the weird
logic of the state action doctrine, it would seem that the involvement of
the private organization in the public action should have converted the
public action into private action and thereby insulated even the action of
UNLV from constitutional scrutiny.
Though Justice Stevens noted the unusual posture of the case, the
majority nevertheless went ahead and considered whether the actions of
the NCAA that led to the suspension had become state action because
of the involvement of UNLV in the operations of the NCAA. The ma-
jority rejected the idea that the NCAA had been converted into a state
91. The district court awarded Tarkanian attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 of
$196,000.00. Reasonably enough under the circumstances, the court ordered the NCAA to
pay 90% of the award. Tarkanian brought the initial action against only UNLV and pre-
vailed, a result in fact favorable to both Tarkanian and UNLV. That decision was overturned
by the Nevada Supreme Court on the motion of the NCAA because, the NCAA argued, it
should have been named as an additional defendant. On remand, Tarkanian amended the
complaint to add the NCAA. Only when Tarkanain prevailed a second time did he move for
attorney's fees. Bizarrely, given the NCAA's role in forcing a second trial, the NCAA none-
theless moved to be realigned as a plaintiff since, it claimed, it actually wanted Tarkanian to
win. Id. at 181, 188-89.
92. The vote was 5-4. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court joined by then
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Scalia and Kennedy. Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. Id. at 199. Justice
O'Connor's vote in Tarkanian departs from an otherwise consistent pattern of voting with the
conservatives. Beginning with Rendall-Baker, 475 U.S. 830, decided the year after her ap-
pointment to the Court, Justice O'Connor joined the conservatives in all four decisions before
Tarkanian. Following Tarkanian, she joined the conservatives in the next two additional deci-
sions before providing the swing vote in Brentwood.
2001]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
actor by virtue of the fact that UNLV had embraced the NCAA's rules
and thereby converted them into state rules.93 Because the University
freely accepted the NCAA's rules when it could have done otherwise,
the Court held, "[n]either UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's stan-
dards nor its minor role in their formulation is a sufficient reason for
concluding that the NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law when
it promulgated standards governing athletic recruitment, eligibility, and
academic performance., 94
The Court also rejected the idea that UNLV and the NCAA should
be regarded as partners or coventurers, like the Eagle Diner and the
City of Wilmington in Burton." The majority observed, that in fact the
interests of UNLV and the NCAA were more accurately regarded as
opposed to one another in the proceedings. 96 Nor had UNLV delegated
any state authority to the NCAA: "UNLV delegated no power to the
NCAA to take specific action against any university employee. The
commitment by UNLV to adhere to NCAA enforcement procedures was
enforceable only by sanctions that the NCAA might impose on UNLV
itself."97
Finally, and most pertinent to Brentwood, the Court also refused to
find that the NCAA was a state actor because UNLV, a public school,
was a member. The NCAA's membership, Justice Stevens observed,
consisted of several hundred other public and private schools, each of
which contributed to the promulgation of the NCAA's rules.98 And
those institutions, Justice Stevens wrote, "the vast majority of which
were located in States other than Nevada, did not act under color of
Nevada law. It necessarily follows that the source of the legislation
adopted by the NCAA is not Nevada but the collective membership,
speaking through an organization that is independent of any particular
State." 99
At this point, however, Justice Stevens dropped a footnote and added
dicta that would later come to haunt the other members of the majority
93. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194.
94. Id. at 195. The quotation also reveals a unique aspect of Justice Stevens' analysis.
Conceding that "under color of state law" was satisfied whenever there was state action, he
used the standards for "under color of state law" to inform the standards for state action.
95. Id. at 196 n.16.
96. Id. at 196.
97. Id. at 195-96 (contrasting the situation in Tarkanian with the circumstances in Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, in which a private physician was held to be a state actor when hired by a state
prison to provide medical care to inmates).
98. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 183.
99. Id. at 193.
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in Brentwood. "The situation would, of course, be different," he said, "if
the membership consisted entirely of institutions located within the same
State, many of them public institutions created by the same sover-
eign." 10 He cited as examples, and apparently thereby endorsed, deci-
sions from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Each case dealt with statewide
high school athletic associations similar to the Association in
Brentwood.10
V. THE DECISION IN BRENTwooD
Even under the Rehnquist-era reformulation of the state action doc-
trine, and particularly after footnote 13 in Tarkanian, it is not difficult to
see how a justice might find state action in the decision of the Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association. Thus, Justice Stevens who wrote
the majority opinion in Tarkanian could consistently join the majority
opinion in Brentwood. Under the Rehnquist-era reformulation of state
action, the touchstone is whether the action of the private defendant can
reasonably be attributed to the state. Prior decisions have come to stand
for a set of paradigms in which the state either compels or encourages
the conduct, makes the conduct possible by delegating an exclusive
power of the state, or is in a symbiotic relationship with the private actor
so that the state in fact facilitates, and in return reaps some benefit from,
the action. In those circumstances it is naturally intuitive to say of the
action that it belongs to the state. One still looks in vain, however, for
an explanation why the private agent ought to be held liable for the
state's action but as long as the Court is stingy in finding state action, as
a practical matter, the oddness of the doctrine has no victims.
In Brentwood there was both a symbiotic relationship between the
State of Tennessee and the TSSAA, as well as something more that per-
haps even overcomes the strangeness of the doctrine. The symbiotic re-
lationship consisted, on the one hand in the regulatory role that the
TSSAA played for the public schools in Tennessee, and Tennessee alone,
unlike with the NCAA in Tarkanian.1°2 That role had at one time been
acknowledged by the State Board of Education and the majority in
Brentwood made much of the declarations of the Board of Education.
100. Id. at 193 n. 13.
101. See generally Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); La. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High Sch., 396
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968).
102. See generally Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179; Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. 924.
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On the other hand, the Association undoubtedly benefited from the
membership of the public schools and their participation in its programs.
The something more was the fact that if we pull aside the Associa-
tion's corporate veil, the Association was substantially dominated by
representatives of public schools in Tennessee. Eighty-four percent of
the members of the Association were Tennessee public schools. 10 3 The
state through these schools "infiltrated" and used the Association in a
way not seen in any other state action decision. In all earlier state action
decisions, the private party was an entity distinct from the state. The
state appeared as a landlord, as a regulatory body, as the enforcer of
informal community customs, i.e., as an entity distinct from the defen-
dant and acting upon the defendant from the outside. In no case did the
state so thoroughly involve itself in the internal operations of the private
defendant.
The integration of the State of Tennessee and the TSSAA falls some-
where between the typical state action case and the more extreme case
of Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.104 In Lebron, eight of
the nine Justices found not merely that the actions of Amtrak consti-
tuted state action but that Amtrak was in fact an agency of the federal
government for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court was
impressed by the fact that Amtrak had been created by Congress, to
further government objectives and the government retained the power
to appoint a majority of Amtrak's board of directors.1°5 The TSSAA in
Brentwood was not created by the state, nor did the state have any au-
thority to appoint more than a single representative to the TSSAA.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of members of the TSSAA were public
schools and the TSSAA, for its public school members, served the im-
portant role of regulating high school athletics. Within the looking glass
world of the state action doctrine, those facts surely can reasonably be
viewed as creating the kind of causal and symbiotic relationship that is
the touchstone of the Rehnquist doctrine.
This is not to say that there is anything unreasonable in refusing to
find state action in Brentwood either. One would have to overcome the
dicta in footnote 13 of Tarkanian, but after all it was dicta about a set of
103. Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. at 932.
104. 513 U.S. 374 (1995). Justice O'Connor alone dissented. I have not discussed Lebron
as a state-action decision because the Court itself in Lebron distinguished the problem in that
case from the typical state action inquiry, whether the action of a private party could be attrib-
uted to the state. The Court regarded the issue in Lebron as whether Amtrak was a govern-
ment agency purposes of the Constitution.
105. Id. at 385.
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facts not before the Court. Much more depends in the first instance on
how one views the character of the public schools and their membership
in the TSSAA. The majority never questioned the nature of the partici-
pation of the public schools. It treated them collectively as the State of
Tennessee. But the public schools were not involved in the TSSAA by
virtue of any mandate from the State. Nor were they as members either
representing the State of Tennessee or setting state policy. The TSSAA
remained a private organization that served both public and private
schools. The principals, assistant principals and athletic directors who
sat on TSSAA committees presumably represented their own schools
and not the State. Particularly with regard to private schools it would be
a stretch to regard the TSSAA's rules as exercises of state authority.
The only authority that the TSSAA had over its members was contrac-
tual, and that was true for public as well as private schools.
What is perhaps most interesting about the majority's opinion in
Brentwood is that with only a bare and ephemeral majority, made possi-
ble because of the mercurial vote of Justice O'Connor,"°6 Justice Souter
took the conception and test of the state action doctrine decidedly back
in the direction of the intuitive, ad hoc doctrine of the pre-Rehnquist
Vinson and Warren Courts. We've seen that under the guidance of Jus-
tice Rehnquist, over the past thirty years, the guiding question has be-
come whether one can fairly say that the challenged private action is
attributable to a state. Fair attribution here is a matter of factual accu-
racy - did the state bring about, encourage or support the activity, or
did the state benefit from the activity so that it is natural to say of the
action that the state is responsible either causally or because the state is
a willing, beneficial participant. Justice Souter, however treated the
question as normative. He said, "[w]hat is fairly attributable is a matter
of normative judgment .. ."I0 Alone, this does not necessarily re-
present a departure from the Rehnquist formulation. One can, after all,
rephrase the Rehnquist formulation as asking whether it is normatively
fair to attribute the private conduct to the state in light of the involve-
ment of the state in the private conduct. The focus of the inquiry re-
mains on the ways in which the state might be viewed to have become
involved in the private activity. More significant is how Justice Souter
106. Recall that Justice O'Connor consistently voted with the conservatives in every state
action decision except Tarkanian and Brentwood. Because she did not a submit a separate
opinion in Tarkanian, her decision to join the liberals in that case and part with her conserva-
tive colleagues is opaque. Given her vote in Tarkanian in favor of treating the NCAA as a
state actor, her decision in Brentwood is at least consistent.
107. Brentwood Acad, 121 S. Ct. at 930.
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treated the past decisions. Instead of regarding them as an exclusive set
of paradigms bound by their tendency to show a causal or symbiotic rela-
tionship, he treated them as no more than instances in which the Court
previously had found state action. He wrote, completing the quote
above,
What is fairly attributable is a matter of normative judgment, and
the criteria lack rigid simplicity. From the range of circumstances
that could point toward the State behind and individual face, no
one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board
for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely
sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason against
attributing activity to the government.10
Justice Souter's characterization of the test of state action bears more
than a passing resemblance to Justice Clark's declaration in Burton that
"to fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsi-
bility under the Equal Protection Clause is an 'impossible task' which
'[t]his Court has never attempted.... Only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance." 1° 9
Justice Souter's treatment of past decisions as merely suggestive is
evident too in his characterization of the situation in Brentwood. He
eschewed analyzing Brentwood under the obvious category of symbiotic
relationship and instead chose to characterize it more vaguely as re-
vealing a significant level of "entwinement" of the State in the private
Association. The vague notion of entwinement again echoes the earlier
open-ended notion of "involvement" that Justice Rehnquist strove to re-
place with a more limited, categorical treatment. It is precisely on this
point that Justice Thomas launched his dissent. Justice Souter also adds
explicitly an element evident in the quote above but never explicitly
stated in any other decision of the Court: the possibility that even if the
facts point to state action, countervailing considerations might neverthe-
less lead the Court not to find state action in the particular case. Thus
the test becomes not only ad hoc, open ended and again intuitive, it be-
comes explicitly a balancing test as well. The majority, at least for the
moment, recast the Court as a tribunal dedicated to justice case by case.
The remainder of Justice Souter's opinion consists in his review of
the facts and conclusion that "'the necessarily fact-bound inquiry' . .
108. Id.
109. Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
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leads to the conclusion of state action here."110 As in every earlier state
action decision, the facts undergo substantial massaging to fit the tests.
For example, Justice Souter seemed to regard the ability of the Associa-
tion to charge admission for tournaments as tantamount to state funding.
He wrote,
Unsurprisingly, then, the record indicates that ... public schools
have largely provided for the Association's financial support. A
small portion of the Association's revenue comes from member-
ship dues paid by the schools, and the principal part from gate
receipts at tournaments among the member schools .... [T]he
schools here obtain membership in the service organization and
give up sources of their own income to their collective associa-
tion. The Association thus exercises the authority of the
predominantly public schools to charge for admission to their
games; the Association does not receive this money from the
schools, but enjoys the schools' moneymaking capacity as its
own.
111
Surely this is a substantial stretch. The Association organizes tourna-
ments for the schools and charges admission for the tournaments that it
organizes.112 It neither needs nor reasonably can be said to be exercising
any power possessed by the public schools when it charges admission to
tournaments that it organizes.
Similarly, Justice Souter overstated the role of the Association in cre-
ating and enforcing state policy. Justice Souter made much of the fact
that in 1972 the Tennessee Board of Education required public schools
in the states with athletic programs to join the Association. That re-
quirement was deleted in 1996. Nevertheless, "the removal of the desig-
nation language... affected nothing but words. ... The most that one
can say on the evidence is that the State Board once freely acknowl-
edged the Association's official character but now does it by winks and
nods.""' 3 Even when the Board of Education required the public
schools to join the Association, however, at best that constituted the
Board's use of the Association to regulate the public schools. There was
no similar requirement then or ever that private schools join or submit
themselves to any regulatory power possessed by the Association. The
only power that the Association had over private schools, like the Brent-
wood Academy, was purely contractual and altogether voluntary.
110. Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. 932 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939).
111. Id.
112. Il
113. Id. at 933.
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VI. THE SCOPE AND DURABILITY OF BRENTWOOD
It would surely grossly exaggerate the significance of Brentwood to
regard it as a watershed for the Court's more moderate members, or as a
turning point in state action jurisprudence. Brentwood concluded as it
did only because of the mercurial vote of Justice O'Connor, who with
the exception of Tarkanian and Brentwood has consistently voted with
her conservative colleagues largely against finding state action in private
conduct. Should Justice O'Connor soon retire and be replaced by some-
one more attuned to the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, as would seem likely, the vote even on a similar case would be
five to four in the other direction.' 14
Should that happen, it would be a relatively easy task to return the
state action doctrine to its more narrow interpretation and perhaps even
to restrict its force for other statewide athletic organizations. Justice
Souter's normative turn is still focused on the involvement of the state in
the private conduct. He did not ask expansively whether it would be fair
in the circumstances to require due process or equal treatment. The ma-
jority's inquiry still focused on the fairness of regarding the private con-
duct as the conduct of the state given the involvement of the state with
the defendant. The notion of entwinement that Justice Souter intro-
duced in Brentwood is also easily assimilated into the Rehnquist para-
digms as yet another way in which the state might be causally
responsible for the acts of a private party.
It will be more difficult to withdraw the veil of state conduct from
state high school athletic organizations, at least without explicitly over-
turning Brentwood. The TSSAA is among the organizations nationally
that have the least connections to their states. Fourteen of forty-six state
associations polled recently report that unlike the TSSAA, they operate
under the authority of their state legislatures. Thirteen of the fourteen
operate under the continuing authority their states' boards of education.
Twenty-seven of the forty-six, like the TSSAA, have on their boards rep-
resentatives from their state departments of education and that person is
uniformly appointed by the board of education or the superintendent of
114. Justice O'Connor's continued presence on the Court is a matter of some speculation.
Jeffrey Rosen, in a recent article in the New York Times Magazine, reports that Justice
O'Connor's husband was overheard lamenting Vice President Al Gore's short-lived apparent
victory in Florida because his wife wanted to retire but Gore's victory made that impossible.
Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, § 6 (Magazine) at 32. Since she
helped to put President Bush into the White House by joining the 5-4 majority to stop the
Florida recount, the speculation is that Justice O'Connor may be favored to replace Chief
Justice Rehnquist should he retire under the current administration. Id.
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public education for the state. No data was available on the number of
states that require public schools to participate in the state association
but Justice Souter and the majority disregarded the fact that the State of
Tennessee did not require public schools to join the Association."' The
decisive factor was the overwhelming dominance of public schools
among the Associations members. All of the factors that moved the ma-
jority - the Association's funding, management, and its role in regulating
public school athletics, derived from that one fact. Consequently, any
state athletic association that includes among its members a substantial
proportion of public schools, comes within the ruling of Brentwood.
Of course it is also possible that Justice O'Connor will not only stay
on the Court, but also enjoy an even greater status for some time. In any
event, Brentwood is likely to effect state athletic associations into the
foreseeable future, subjecting them to the rigors of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court did not reach, in Brentwood, the substantive
issue and there remains at least one further threshold question that
might yet prevent state associations from having to amend their bylaws.
Even if state athletic associations are regarded as state actors, the due
process clause will apply to sanctions imposed by state athletic associa-
tions, and in particular to suspensions, only if members have a property
interest in continuing to participate in association tournaments. In gen-
eral, since the Court's decision in Board of Regents v. Roth' 6 in 1972,
government benefits, including employment or largesse, are treated as
property interests protected by the due process clause only if the claim-
ant is "entitled" to the continuation of the benefit under applicable law.
Thus, if continued membership in an association is guaranteed absent
cause, membership will be regarded as a property interest and the associ-
ation will be required to abide by the requirements of due process as a
prelude to any penalty. A more thorough discussion of this issue, alas, is
beyond the scope of this brief article.
115. All information provided in this paragraph is drawn from a survey recently com-
pleted by the National Federation of State High School Associations. NAT'L FED'N OF STATE
HIGH ScH. ASS'NS, available at www.nfhs.org (survey results not available online; however,
contact information provided from which results may be requested).
116. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See generally JOHN E. Now~AK, ET AL., CONSTrUooNAL LAW
§ 13.5 (6th ed. 2000).
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